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FINDING REVELATION IN ANTHROPOLOGY: 
Alexander Winchell, William Robertson Smith, and the Heretical Imperative  
 
 
David N. Livingstone* 
 
 
Abstract:  Anthropological inquiry has often been considered an agent of intellectual 
secularization. Not least is this so in the sphere of religion, where anthropological 
accounts have often been taken to represent the triumph of naturalism. This 
metanarrative however fails to recognise that naturalistic explanations could sometimes 
be espoused for religious purposes and in defence of confessional creeds.  This essay 
examines two late nineteenth-century figures – Alexander Winchell in the United States, 
and William Robertson Smith in Britain – who found in anthropological analysis 
resources to bolster rather than undermine faith.  In both cases these individuals found 
themselves on the receiving end of ecclesiastical censure and were dismissed from their 
positions at church-governed institutions. But their motivation was to vindicate divine 
revelation, in Winchell’s case from the physical anthropology of human origins and in 
Smith’s from the cultural anthropology of Semitic ritual. 
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FINDING REVELATION IN ANTHROPOLOGY: 





As the ecclesiastical equivalent of blood sports, heresy hunting in the nineteenth century 
attracted a large following. Two cases, one on each side of the Atlantic, gripped public 
imaginations in the spring of 1878. Newspaper articles recounted their fate; the 
individuals concerned were dismissed from their academic posts; and both later found 
themselves hanging side-by-side in Andrew Dickson White’s gallery of scientific 
martyrdom. On  June 16 that year, the Nashville Daily American announced to its readers 
that a charge of ‘“Heresy” at Vanderbilt’ had just been brought against one of the 
university’s professors and it allowed the ‘heretic’ space to explain himself in a piece 
entitled ‘Science Gagged in Nashville’.1 The summary dismissal of the geologist 
Alexander Winchell (1824-1891) from his chair made headline news as the story spread 
like wildfire and attracted the editorialising pens of the Chattanooga Commercial, the 
Knoxville Chronicle, the Memphis Appeal and the Nashville Banner.2 Two or three weeks 
earlier, on May 28, four thousand miles away, the Aberdeen Weekly Journal updated its 
readers, in an article entitled ‘The Aberdeen Heresy Case’, on the latest twist of events in 
the libel suit currently before the Free Church of Scotland. Its final shot expressed the 
paper’s disgruntlement at the likely irresolution of the outcome. It seemed that the Free 
Assembly would do nothing more than dismiss ‘the clever, learned, and conceited young 
Professor from its bar, with some graceful and discreet new version of the old verdict –
 “Not guilty; but don’t do it again”’.3 Whereas Winchell’s execution was short, if not 
sweet, it would take a further three years before William Robertson Smith (1846-1894) 
eventually succumbed to the messy hewing of his denomination’s legislative axe. But the 
outcome was the same. In May 1881 he was removed from his chair in Aberdeen on the 
grounds that it was no longer ‘safe or advantageous for the Church that Professor Smith 
should continue to teach in one of her colleges’.4  
As a seemingly appropriate act of remembrance, Andrew Dickson White 
memorialised the demise of these respective chair-holders in a paragraph designed to 
counter any thought that Catholicism was more guilty than Protestantism of muzzling 
free inquiry:  
 
Nothing is more unjust than to cast especial blame for all this resistance to science 
upon the Roman Church. The Protestant Church, though rarely able to be so severe, 
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has been more blameworthy. The persecution of Galileo and his compeers by the 
older Church was mainly at the beginning of the seventeenth century; the persecution 
of Robertson Smith, and Winchell … by various Protestant authorities, was near the 
end of the nineteenth century.5 
 
The stigma of heresy may well have clung to Winchell and Smith, not least as they 
were widely exhibited as proponents of free thought untrammelled by a crippling 
confessionalism. But there is every reason to think that their espousal of anthropological 
perspectives sprang from deep-seated religious convictions. In different ways their 
concern was to show how subjecting traditional dogmas to scientific scrutiny could 
secure rather than sabotage Christian theology. This means that the adoption of 
naturalistic explanations of anthropological phenomena cannot be taken to mean that its 
practitioners automatically rejected the idea that God had revealed himself in history and 
that the Christian scriptures bore witness to his self-disclosure.6 Winchell and Smith thus 
serve my purposes in two ways.  First, they act as fulcrum points for inspecting 
something of how naturalistic explanations, carefully circumscribed, could be put to 
work as an ally of faith. Second, they disclose how such tactics manifested themselves in 
projects pivotal to Victorian anthropology - the physical anthropology of human origins 
and the cultural anthropology of religious systems. 
On both sides of the Atlantic, of course, nineteenth-century anthropological inquiry 
was widely regarded as subversive of the idea that scripture bore witness to divine 
revelation. In the United States, it has been suggested, ‘the first real triumph of science’ 
lay in anthropology, with its ‘formulation of polygenetic theories of human origin’. 
According to Brown, the ‘repudiation of the biblical chronology’ was crucial to these 
endeavours – endeavours which contributed in a major way to the ‘establishment, 
institutionalization and authority of American scientific work’.7 Josiah Nott and George 
Gliddon, for example, both prominent figures in the American School of Ethnology, 
were renowned for their anticlericalism and for castigating their opponents as ‘advocates 
of murky theology and benighted superstition’. Delighting in what they called ‘parson 
skinning’, they hungrily fell upon every scrap of evidence they could find to undermine 
the traditional biblical doctrine of human unity through common descent from Adam.8 A 
passionate rejection of any theological justification for human unity was integral to Nott 
and Gliddon’s repudiation of abolitionism and their belief in ineradicable black 
inferiority. Thus it is not surprising that castigating the biblical narrative was fundamental 
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to their anthropological project. As Nott observed in 1848: ‘Astronomy and geology, so 
long kept down by bigotry and ignorance, have triumphed, and the day is at hand when 
the natural history of man will burst the trammels which have so long held it captive … 
My main object, therefore, in this volume, is to cut loose the natural history of mankind 
from the Bible’.9 Thereby, as Stanton notes, he firmly located anthropological 
investigations of human origins at the heart of ‘the warfare which had long raged 
between science and theology’.10 Nott evidently enjoyed any fuss he was able to incite. 
His attack on the authenticity of the Pentateuch was intended to ‘stir up hell in the 
Christians’ and he rejoiced that ‘some of the “godly” had “never slept”’ since they 
learned of his crusade.11 If anything Gliddon was yet more outrageous, castigating 
clergymen as ‘skunks’ and throwing himself with gusto into the polygenists’ favourite 
pursuit: incessantly ‘hammering at the biblical chronology’.12 With champions like this it 
is entirely understandable that members of the American School of Anthropology, as it 
came to be called, were widely regarded as ‘passionate rejecters of Revelation’.13 
Alongside their dedication to chattel slavery, the ‘bond’ which linked these figures was 
‘anticlericalism and antibiblicism’.14 As Abraham Coles quipped at the time in an 
extended critique of Nott and Gliddon’s ethnological writings: ‘To be a good reasoner it 
is necessary to be an infidel and a believer in slavery’.15 
In Europe, anthropological enterprises were no less increasingly associated with a 
denial of divine revelation in history and, a fortiori, scripture. In large measure, as the 
anthropologist stewart Guthrie notes, anthropological accounts of religion were ‘secular 
and naturalistic’, explaining ‘religions as products of human culture and human nature, 
not as manifestations of anything transcendental, supernatural, or otherwise sui generis’.16 
In France, for example, many late-nineteenth century anthropologists involved 
themselves in atheist campaigns of one sort or another. Paul Broca, according to the 
historian-philosopher Jennifer Hecht, ‘was committed to rational explanation and the 
questioning of biblical truth’, and used polygenism as a tool to counter Catholic 
theological anthropology and to foster ‘a coherent scientific-atheist movement that lasted 
into the following century’.  Darwin’s ‘vigorously antireligious’ translator, the materialist 
Clémence Royer, was convinced that the use of natural scientific methods necessitated a 
head-on collision with religious belief.17 Taken in the round members of the Société 
d’Anthropologie (which included Royer) were committed to de-Christianising the 
Republic by installing the new scientific study of the human race in the place hitherto 
occupied by theological authority. 
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In Britain this same antipathy to revelation relied heavily on versions of cultural 
evolutionism that are often regarded as the ‘perspective with which anthropology started 
life’.18 The writings of figures such as Edward B. Tylor, James G. Frazer and Henry S. 
Maine dominated the anthropological horizon and collectively promoted the Comtean 
vision that ‘monotheistic Christianity, though advanced as a religion, is only one stage on 
man’s progress towards reason’.19 Overall, the historian of anthropology Henrika Kuklick 
judges, Victorian anthropology’s collective ‘attitude to religion was hostile. 
Anthropologists intended to repudiate Christianity’; in their day, as contributors to A.C. 
Haddon’s memorial tribute announced, ‘to be an anthropologist was generally considered 
equivalent to being an agnostic and free-thinker’.20 
Tylor, often dubbed the father of anthropology in Europe, coupled an evolutionary 
account of religious faith together with the idea of cultural survivals from earlier ages, in 
order to explain why theological beliefs could persist in the absence of truthful cognitive 
content. Animated by strongly anti-Catholic sentiments, his anthropological writings 
helped fuel the image of inherent warfare between science and religion.21 Recalling 
Tylor’s Quaker background, the intellectual historian John Burrow tellingly observed: 
  
Theology was Tylor’s particular concern, and he turned to it with the air of one about 
to cleanse the temple of the Lord, ominously remarking: ‘It is with a sense of 
attempting an investigation which bears very closely upon the current theology of 
our own day, that I have set myself to examine systematically, among the lower races, 
the development of animism’.22  
 
George Stocking concurs with Burrow, insisting that the logical thrust of Tylor’s Primitive 
Culture was ‘clearly to reduce Christianity’ to the ‘category of ‘mythology’.’ ‘Rather than 
God having created man in His image’, he adds, Tylor’s judgment was that ‘man had, 
through evolutionary time, created God in his’.23 As for Frazer, ‘even more anti-Christian 
than Tylor’ according to the historian of religion Ivan Strenski, his magnum opus, The 
Golden Bough, advanced ‘a theory of the evolution of religion that sought to discredit the 
privileged, revealed status of Christianity’.24 
While differing in particulars, the work of the Victorian anthropologists overall 
conveyed a strong sense that the enterprise’s practitioners, as Edmund Leach put it, were 
of ‘agnostic rationalist persuasion’.25 In similar vein, Edward E. Evans-Pritchard, 
reflecting on his own later professional experience as an anthropologist, observed in his 
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Aquinas Lecture for 1959: ‘Almost all the leading anthropologists of my own generation 
would, I believe, hold that religious faith is total illusion … Religion is superstition to be 
explained by anthropologists, and not something an anthropologist, or indeed any 
rational person, could himself believe in’.26 Religious belief was thus variously explained – 
or perhaps better, explained away – as a mechanism for fostering social solidarity and 
promoting community harmony, as mere wishful thinking to cope with crippling fears, 
or as a primitive means of explaining the universe that at best anticipated real science.  
The adoption of naturalistic methods of inquiry as the ‘distinctive mark of an 
anthropological study of religion’ has thus routinely been seen as a strategy to undermine 
any idea that scripture bore witness to divine revelation.27 What this conventional reading 
tends to eclipse, however, are the ways in which the naturalistic methods of 
anthropological science could be used to bolster rather than demolish belief in divine 
revelation, and thereby to rescue it from agnostic reductionism of one stripe or another. 
The two individuals I have chosen to examine self-consciously set out to defend the 
belief that God had revealed himself, in one way or another, in scripture and history even 
though their respective ecclesiastical communities shunned their efforts and condemned 
their efforts as heretical. 
Winchell had been appointed to the position of professor of geology and zoology at 
the newly-formed University of Vanderbilt in 1875, having previously occupied posts at 
the University of Michigan and Syracuse University. Here he sought to find ways of 
keeping his scientific and religious convictions in conceptual tandem. But his efforts 
were not welcomed by the Vanderbilt board of trustees, not least when he adopted the 
findings of prehistoric anthropology. Smith took up the chair of Hebrew at the Aberdeen 
Free Church College in 1870 and found in German higher criticism a valuable tool in 
making sense of the Old Testament.  He also applied insights from conjectural prehistory 
and the anthropology of religion to the Hebrew Bible claiming that the findings of these 
sciences could be of theological benefit in interpreting the biblical documents. 
Winchell and Smith, of course, were located in very different spaces which shaped, in 
significantly different ways, their theological, anthropological and scientific 
preoccupations.28 In Winchell’s situation, in the heart of the American South where 
matters of ethnic relations and postbellum reconstruction loomed large, the tension 
between science and religion manifested itself most conspicuously in the arena of race 
history. Winchell was certain that the scientific investigations of the anthropologists into 
human origins and religious systems could help purge creeds and dogmas ‘supposed to 
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be inculcated by texts of revelation’. In so doing he was sure that ‘revelation’ would 
remain standing and that the ‘religious system’ would be rendered ‘invincible to the 
assaults of its enemies’ as much as to the ‘suicidal daggers of its friends’.29 Smith, by 
contrast, found himself at the eye of a gathering storm over the introduction of the new 
biblical criticism into Britain. While he was convinced that it could aid theology in 
significant ways, most of his fellow churchmen considered biblical criticism to be a 
deeply suspicious enterprise. As part of this project he turned to the methods of 
historical anthropology. His extraordinarily innovative use of anthropological methods, 
however, led him in a radically different direction from the likes of Tylor and Frazer. 
Certainly he no longer espoused the traditional understanding of scripture as an infallible 
text, a collection of inerrant propositions. But as Mary Douglas insists: ‘Robertson Smith 
never wavered in his faith in the Bible as a record of specific, supernatural Revelation’.30 
Whatever the differences between Winchell and Smith, my aim in this essay is to 
supplement scholarship that troubles the assumption that naturalistic science necessarily 
entailed a repudiation of divine agency by redrawing attention to ways in which 
naturalistic methods could fit with metaphysical convictions about how God was 
believed to act in the natural world.31  
 
Alexander Winchell, Human Origins and the Peyrèrean Shadow 
When the Methodist-governed University of Vanderbilt in Tennessee eventually secured 
the services of Alexander Winchell (1824-1891) for several months a year in 1876, it had 
managed to win for the newly-born institution one of America’s leading men of science. 
By the time he arrived, Winchell – a prominent Methodist – was already renowned as an 
authority on science and religion, as well as for his technical work on petrology and 
mineralogy.32 Twice Director of the Michigan Geological Survey, Winchell’s expertise 
was wide-ranging, encompassing physics and engineering as well as geology, zoology, and 
botany –  all of which he had taught at various times between 1853 and 1873 at the 
University of Michigan. Prior to arriving at Vanderbilt, Winchell had occupied the 
position of first chancellor of Syracuse University, and following his dismissal from 
Vanderbilt he returned to Michigan to concentrate on geology and palaeontology.  
Winchell’s downfall has been attributed to different causes.33 His espousal of 
evolution is one. Andrew Dickson White certainly took that view, announcing that ‘he 
was driven forth for his views which centred in the Darwinian theory’.34 Undoubtedly 
Winchell did increasingly adopt evolution. In 1877, for example, he opened his 
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Reconciliation of Science and Religion with the observation that in its pages the reader would 
‘detect indications of a growing faith’ in ‘the derivative origin of species’ along the lines 
of Edward Drinker Cope’s Neo-Lamarckism.35 On the Vanderbilt faculty there were 
those who abominated evolution. It was a pet peeve of the Dean, Thomas Summers, 
whom Winchell regarded as one of the ‘old bigots’ whose ‘medieval influence’ had 
lingered longer than it should.36 ‘Evolution!’ Winchell snapped. ‘This is the bugbear so 
big and dark that nothing else could be heard or read by Dr Summers whenever I 
employed tongue or pen’.37 For his part, Summers pointedly recorded in his dairy that a 
Sunday afternoon lecture by Winchell had made him ‘quite unwell’: ‘He thinks the 
nebular theory and evolution are not incompatible with the Bible. I cannot reconcile 
them’.38  
There were other factors too. The appearance in 1878 of a set of essays by Winchell 
entitled Adamites and Preadamites, which argued that the earth had been peopled long 
before the biblical Adam, sent shock waves through the Southern Methodist 
connexion.39 Later Winchell developed these 50 or so pages into a book ten times the 
length.40 Its ugly racial rhetoric is only too conspicuous, even if typical of the brisk 
Southern trade in works of  anthropology, comparative anatomy and archaeology.41 On 
superficial inspection, the whole document smelled of the polygenist anthropology being 
promoted by the Nott-Gliddon-Morton brigade. And that surely rubbed the Wesleyan 
fraternity the wrong way, violating the Methodist dedication to the unity of the human 
race.42 Summers declared that it was because his ‘development of evolution and 
polygenism became so pronounced’ that the University had to fire him43 – a diagnostic 
phrasing that was picked up by the Nashville American.44 In fact that judgment was quite 
mistaken, for Winchell explicitly nailed his colours to the monogenist mast by declaring: 
“I have not affirmed … that mankind, one in moral nature, are not one in origin; since I 
believe the blood of the first human stock flows in the veins of every living human 
being’.45 For all that, his use of anthropological data generated by polygenetic 
anthropologists such as Morton, Nott and Gliddon fuelled the flames of suspicion.  
There were other cross-currents too. Winchell’s proposals concerning an extensive 
pre-adamic history of human groups – particularly the black races – raised troubling 
anxieties over whether these races lay beyond the scope of redemption: about what the 
Adamic fall from grace and original sin might mean in the new anthropological cosmos; 
and what the implications might be for a denomination putting strenuous efforts into 
church outreach to the black community.46 Rev Samuel Keneer Cox, for example, editor 
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of the Episcopal Methodist, feared that Winchell’s strategy for reconciling science with 
scripture ‘totally alienates the African race from the blessings of the New and Everlasting 
Covenant’. The St Louis Christian Advocate, meanwhile, worried that it would undermine 
the denomination’s ministry among members of the black population. Winchell worked 
hard to rebut slurs such as these.47  
The fact that Winchell advertised the anthropological wares of the seventeenth 
century arch-heretic, Isaac La Peyrère, hardly helped either. According to the historian of 
philosophy Richard Popkin, La Peyrère ‘was regarded as perhaps the greatest heretic of 
the age’.48 Peyrère’s polygenism, he judged, was the ‘real spectre haunting Western 
thought … the most fundamental challenge to the Judaeo-Christian tradition to arise 
from the “new science” and the “new philosophy”’.49 As for Winchell, he thought 
Peyrère ‘a victim of the intolerance of the times’ whose insights were ‘far in advance of 
his age’; later Winchell berated Peyrère’s adversaries as ‘the bond slaves of dogma’.50 In 
the American South, Peyrère’s pre-adamism was well known to the likes of Nott and 
Gliddon, and no sooner had Winchell recruited him to his cause than the loathsome  
alliance with these modern infidels was spotted by reviewers.  
Winchell’s viciously racial anthropology fell foul of Methodist sensibilities of course, 
not least because some believed his conception of the black races placed them beyond 
the scheme of redemption. But it is no less clear that his turn to natural science 
explanations was also deeply troublesome. In the aftermath of the fracas, the October 
1878 meeting of the Tennessee Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, 
declared that ‘scientific atheism’ had lately been spotted stalking the halls of academia 
and that its advocates were busily engaged in deluding ‘the unthinking mass’. It was 
proud to report, however, that ‘our university alone has had the courage to lay its young 
but vigorous hand upon the mane of untamed Speculation and say, “We will have no 
more of this”’.51 Summers had already said as much and more. Back in July he had 
congratulated Vanderbilt on steadfastly resisting ‘atheistic, materialistic, anti-Church’ 
forces and reminded his readers that good Methodists did not want their children 
educated in an atmosphere of ‘genteel infidelity’.52 The Wesleyan Christian Advocate 
concurred, informing its readers that Winchell’s ‘pernicious speculations’, if left 
unchecked, would ‘directly contribute to sceptical habits of mind among the students’.53 
The savour of speculative naturalism that many felt attached to Winchell’s science 
doubtless arose on account of guilt by association with secular champions of 
evolutionary biology and polygenist anthropology. But it also stemmed from certain of 
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his methodological pronouncements. Winchell was a committed theist, yet he was 
persuaded that the conventional distinction between primary and secondary causes was 
altogether unhelpful in thinking about scientific explanation. Because he was convinced 
of the ubiquity of natural law, he preferred to ‘regard Supreme Intelligence as acting 
without intervention’ in the ‘evolution of life’s beginnings’ – a stance he supported by 
calling on the testimony of Darwin and Huxley.54 Though he was certain that ‘divine 
immanence’ did ‘not conflict with the doctrine of law’ he was fully aware that turning to 
the reign of law could sound like atheism. And so he quoted his fellow-Methodist Draper 
to the effect that it was ‘a more noble view of the government of this world to impute its 
order to a penetrating, primitive wisdom, which could foresee consequences through a 
future eternity, and provide for them in the original plan, at the outset, than to invoke the 
perpetual intervention of an ever-acting, spiritual agency’.55 
Far from practising atheistic science, Winchell was sure that his scientific enthusiasms 
were fully compatible with his theological confession. In turning to natural science, 
Winchell believed he was defending, not destabilising, the integrity of divine revelation 
and of the Bible as witness to it. To begin with, he was sure that the ‘Hebrew people had 
not attained to that degree of secular knowledge, and intellectual culture, and aesthetic 
refinement, which enabled their inspired writers to leave a record which, in all its details 
of style, should commend itself to the highest refinement the race was destined to attain’. 
This meant that the ancient Hebrews ‘were unable to divest themselves, at times, of 
those very anthropomorphic conceptions which disfigure the mythologies of the Greeks 
and other ancient nations’. The implication was plain. It was the task of modern exegetes 
‘to penetrate beneath the anthropomorphic garb of the sacred teachings, and discover 
there the spiritual Being of purity and beneficence whose attributes, in other portions of 
our Scriptures, are so adequately and so eloquently described’.56 Properly prosecuted, 
Winchell believed, scientific inquiry could liberate the biblical record from charges of 
incoherence and contradiction and coax timeless meaning out of ancient shadows.  
In his controversial Adamites and Preadamites Winchell elaborated upon this point. 
Because ‘the inspired writers have sometimes plunged into the midst of the profound 
and mysterious facts of science’, Winchell began, ‘why not, then, summon all our 
knowledge to the task of evoking the meaning of the text?’. ‘I maintain against the narrow 
and pernicious dogma that the Bible is sufficient everywhere to interpret itself,’ he went 
on, arguing instead that ‘it was ordained to be interpreted under the concentrated light of 
all the learning which has been created by a God-given intelligence in man’. This was 
 11 
particularly so with the anthropological sciences: ‘we are at this day in possession of 
many collateral lines of evidence to place by the side of old scriptural interpretation. We 
can summon ethnology, archaeology and anthropology to bear witness’. By bringing the 
findings of these human sciences to bear on the Hebrew Bible, its interpretation would 
be freed from the ‘dialectic skill which characterized the scholastic theology’ as well as 
‘the dicta of councils and ecclesiastics’. On the particular question of the dispersal of the 
human species across the face of the earth, dogmatic proclamations about the 
repopulation of the world after Noah’s flood had to surrender to a hermeneutic 
grounded in anthropological revelations. ‘Whether the world has been populated by 
people who spread from Ararat forty-two centuries ago, or even from Mesopotamia 
fifty-nine centuries ago,’ he maintained, ‘is a question of fact, to be investigated strictly 
on the basis of scientific evidence’.57  
Among the gifts that anthropological breakthroughs could bring to biblical revelation, 
then, was the clarification of texts that had too long remained locked up in the 
hermeneutic prison of traditional exegesis. Nowhere was this more pointedly relevant 
than in the doctrine of the unity of the human race, grounded in universal descent from 
Adam and Eve. The traditional reading of the Genesis chronology, Winchell contended, 
violated the fundamental principle of human consanguinity for the simple reason that if 
‘human beings have existed but 6,000 years, then the different races had separate beginnings, 
as Agassiz long since maintained’. This was because the available timescale was massively 
inadequate for humanity’s ethnic differentiation and geographical diffusion to have taken 
place. Fortunately, anthropological investigations had shown how monogenism could be 
rescued from subversion by traditionalist creationism. As he went on: ‘… if all human 
beings are descended from one stock, then the starting point was more than 6,000 years 
back: as Huxley and the evolutionists generally maintain; and the Duke of Argyll and 
other anti-evolutionists equally maintain’. Winchell was marshalling anthropological 
science in the service of Methodist monogenism. Acknowledging the existence of a 
much earlier common stock from which the Adamic family had descended, Winchell 
believed, had theological consequences dear to the heart of every good Wesleyan.  For it 
was in keeping with St Paul’s doctrine announced in the book of the Acts of the Apostles 




This view recognizes the unity of man; the possession of ‘one blood’ by all the races, 
one moral and intellectual nature, and one destiny; it recognizes Adam as the 
progenitor of the nations which form the theme of biblical history; it explains sundry 
biblical allusions and implications – for instance, the wife found by Cain in the land 
of Nod; Cain’s fear of violence from others when condemned to the life of a ‘fugitive 
and a vagabond’; …it validates the biblical chronology’.58  
 
The extended sweep of time that palaeo-anthropology delivered thus resolved several 
long-standing conundrums. Racial diversity had been simply inexplicable on the standard 
reading. ‘The time from Adam (according to accepted chronology) to the date at which 
we know the negro type had been fully established,’ for example, was ‘vastly too brief for 
so great a divergence, in view of the imperceptible amount of divergence since such 
date’. Explaining the advanced state of cultures ‘celebrated for agriculture, mechanics, 
and music’ that were portrayed in the periods between Adam, Noah and the days of 
Peleg was ‘greatly accommodated and relieved by a larger allowance of time’. For it was 
just extremely ‘difficult to believe’ that the degree of linguistic diversity, the extent of 
urban society, and the range of nationalities depicted could have ‘come into existence 
from one family in the space of 131 years’ – the period of time Winchell computed using 
patriarchal chronology from Noah’s flood to the birth of Peleg’s son.59 Scientific 
evidence for the continuing existence of human cultures predating Adam resolved at a 
stroke such tensions. 
Winchell’s adventures in historical anthropology had convinced him that it ‘was many 
thousand years ago that the first being appeared which could be called a man … That 
first of all men did not make his advent in Asia, nor in Europe, nor in America. He 
appeared either in Africa or in a continental land which stretched from Madagascar to 
the East Indies’. That these creatures were fully human Winchell had no doubt, for they 
had ‘implanted’ within them ‘the divine spark of intelligence’, ‘listened to the voice of 
conscience and felt the claims of duty’. Generations passed until the ‘time arrived, at 
length, when, under the law of progressive development, a grade had been reached nearly 
on a level with that of modern civilized man, in respect to native capacities. Now 
appeared the founder of the Adamic family. His home was in central Asia’.60  
While this scenario might trouble the old guard, Winchell had no doubts about the 
theological benefits such a scheme delivered: 
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If it traverses old opinions, we need not mourn. New truths are better than old 
errors … The loss of a belief, like the death of a friend, seems a bereavement; but a 
false belief is only an enemy in a friend’s cloak. It is only truth which is divine; and 
if we embrace an error, we shall not find it ratified in the oracles of divine truth. 
… If our creed embodies a dogma which enunciates what is really a conclusion, 
true or false, based on scientific evidence – that is, evidence brought to light by 
observation and research – that may be exscinded as an excrescence. All such 
subjects are to be settled by scientific investigation – not by councils of the church. 
Ecclesiastical faith has had a very sorry experience in the attempt to sanctify 
popular opinions.61 
 
More than two centuries earlier, in 1657, Winchell’s predecessor, Isaac La Peyrère, 
had been stigmatised as a heretic for his pre-adamite theory and forced to recant before 
Pope Alexander VII. While Peyrère was often paraded as the quintessential sceptic, there 
is reason to suggest, as Grafton does, that Peyrère too believed that ‘by making Genesis a 
more reasonable text, he would make it more convincing’.62 Winchell certainly thought 
him fundamentally orthodox – a right-headed believer mustering the insights of 
contemporary science to preserve the integrity of Pentateuchal chronology. This was 
Winchell’s passion too. And if this was heresy, then heresy was an obligation. As things 
turned out, Winchell stood in Peyrère’s shadow in more ways than one.  
 
William Robertson Smith, Textual Evolution and Mimetic Cannibalism  
William Robertson Smith is widely regarded as having made foundational contributions 
to cultural anthropology, the sociology of religion, and biblical criticism.63 Testimonials 
abound. Freud told his readers that it was impossible to convey ‘any notion of the 
lucidity or … argumentative force’ of the ‘many-sided … keen and free-thinking’ Smith. 
Elsewhere Freud simply described him as a ‘man of genius’.64 Durkheim celebrated the 
remarkable ‘revolution’ that Smith had accomplished in his theory of sacrifice.65 And 
Mary Douglas condensed his influence in the acerbic quip: ‘Durkheim took up [Smith’s] 
central thesis and set comparative religion in fruitful lines. Frazer took up his incidental 
minor thesis, and sent comparative religion into a blind alley’.66 
In 1876, when the first stirrings of heresy Angst over Smith were beginning to be 
heard on the floor of the Free Church Assembly in Scotland, these accolades were still in 
the distant future. Had they been available to Smith’s adversaries, of course, such tributes 
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would only have confirmed them in their opinion that the young professor kept 
altogether bad company. Applause from the likes of Freud and Durkheim would simply 
have attested to the infidel cast of Smith’s mind. What had catapulted Smith into the 
limelight was an article on the ‘Bible’ he had just published in the ninth edition of the 
Encyclopaedia Britannica.67 In it, he introduced the thinking of the continental higher critics, 
arguing that three main sources ran through significant parts of the Old Testament – a 
Levitico-Elohistic strand using the term ‘Elohim’ for God; a Jehovistic narrative in which 
God, termed YHWY, appears as an anthropomorphic figure; and the work of an 
unknown author specially interested in the ancestors of the northern kingdom. Central to 
his analysis was the fundamental distinction Smith drew between the priestly and 
prophetic traditions in ancient Israel, the former ordinarily finding the ‘progressive ideas’ 
of the latter ‘distasteful to their natural conservatism and aristocratic instincts’. What 
governed his entire approach to the reconstruction of the compositional history of the 
Hebrew scriptures, was the idea of what he called ‘the gradual development of the 
religion of revelation’. Smith resorted to Darwinian-sounding rhetoric in depicting the 
evolutionary path of Hebrew spirituality by speaking of the ‘struggle’ between different 
religious impulses and the survival of those elements which proved themselves ‘fitter 
than any other belief to supply all the religious needs of the people’.68 All of this rubbed 
entirely the wrong way the traditional conception of the Bible as propositional revelation 
by direct divine communication, operating beyond the laws of nature. Smith dismissed 
that ‘mere mechanical theory’, and asserted that the experience of divine disclosure did 
not annihilate – or even suspend – a single element of the prophet’s personality or 
mental processes. The prophet was no ‘mere lyre struck by the plectrum of the Spirit’.69 
Such claims disturbed conservative elements in the Free Church to the core and charges 
were soon brought against Smith for the ‘dangerous and unsettling tendency’ of his 
thought.70  
With its labyrinthine twists and turns, the case dragged on for several years. It was 
initially dismissed in May 1880 albeit with an ‘admonishment’ to the professor that ‘in the 
time to come you will carefully guard against all approach to the same line and the same 
tone of statement’.71 Smith willingly acquiesced. But no sooner had the verdict been 
announced than another earthquake tremor was registered on the heresy-hunters’ Richter 
scale. A second case was underway.  
The very day on which the 1880 Assembly concluded its business, the new issue of 
the Journal of Philology appeared. It carried an article by Smith; ominously, it dealt with 
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animal worship in the Old Testament. The mainsprings of this latest offering dated back 
to Smith’s reading of the Scottish lawyer and parliamentary draughtsman John Ferguson 
McLennan (1827-1881) who, in 1869-70, had published a three-part essay on animal and 
plant worship for the Fortnightly Review.72 Here he advanced an account of totemism 
according to which a plant or animal is adopted by a tribal group as an emblem of the 
clan and plays a fundamental role in the social functioning of primitive religion through 
being the object of worship.73 This theory built on McLennan’s earlier 1865 Primitive 
Marriage, which portrayed early humans as savages living in a promiscuous horde. Here 
McLennan painted a picture of the origins of civilization as both matriarchal and 
polyandric, and ultimately rooted in the unintended consequences of female infanticide.74 
These narratives were grounded in McLennan’s social-evolutionary conception of 
progress from savagery to civilisation. They relied heavily on the idea of ‘survivals’75 – a 
mode of explanation that made much of the persistence of functionless rituals lingering 
from earlier phases of human history such as ceremonial customs associated with bride-
kidnapping. In the transition from savagery to civilisation, McLennan located tribal 
groups bound together by totemism and he used their totemic names as a means of 
identifying clans engaging in exogamy.  
Smith applied this way of thinking to the Old Testament, exploring such themes as 
animal gods, totem tribes, exogamy, matriarchal kinship and levirate marriage in the 
Hebrew Bible76. He quickly came to the conclusion that his findings were ‘remarkably 
confirmatory of Mr McLennan’s theory – a theory framed almost absolutely without 
reference to the Semitic races’. Smith began by reviewing what he called the ‘pure 
polytheism’ of ancient Arabia so as to provide historical context for his treatment of 
early Israel where he argued that the ‘spiritual religion’ had to struggle against ‘the relics 
of ancestral heathenism’. Among the evidences for this struggle, he believed, was a wide 
range of tribes and families with animal names which had totemic significance. King 
David, for example, apparently belonged to the serpent stock. Coupling such findings 
with scrutiny of the Levitical laws concerning incest and food, Smith was convinced that 
‘superstition of the totem kind had still a hold on the Israelites in the last years of the 
independence of the kingdom of Judah’. The perception of ancient Hebrew religion as 
‘constitutionally monotheistic’ with ‘a lofty character from which spiritual ideas were 
easily developed’ was thus far mistaken. To the contrary, his conclusion was that ‘the 
superstitions with which the spiritual religion had to contend were not one whit less 
degrading than those of the most savage nations’.77  
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If Smith hoped that this venture would lie buried on dusty shelves, he was mistaken, 
for Rev. George Macaulay was on the look-out. On Thursday 29 July 1880, Macaulay 
informed readers of The Scotsman of his resolve to press the Church authorities ‘to issue 
an edict peremptorily prohibiting Professor Smith from the exercise of his functions as 
minister and professor in the Church’. The denomination, he insisted, was in grave peril, 
and its traditional standards had to be protected from Smith’s ‘pernicious views’.78 
Smith’s account of ancient Semitic marriage codes and animal worship were described by 
Macaulay as ‘so gross and so fitted to pollute the moral sentiments of the community’ 
that they could not be aired beyond ‘the closed doors of any court of this Church’.79 
These allegations proved to be the opening shots in the final phase of the five-year-long 
campaign to unseat Smith. The guillotine fell in the early hours of May 25, 1881 and 
Smith’s tenure of his chair was terminated.80 
Smith’s theories about the authorship, dating and historicity of various biblical books 
were deeply troubling, but so too was the odour of rationalistic speculation that he 
seemed to exude. In March 1878, The Scotsman reported the views of a certain Mr Arthur 
that the ‘tendency’ of Smith’s outlook could best be judged by the current condition of 
the Protestant Church in Germany; it ‘was thoroughly leavened with infidelity and 
rationalism’.81 Shortly after Smith’s initial acquittal, Dr Kennedy, minister of the Free 
Church in Dingwall, complained that it was his ‘display of rationalism’ that had ‘decoyed’ 
the Church’s ‘leading men off the ground’ on which they should have stood firm.82 Dr 
Horatius Bonar, later moderator of the Free Church General Assembly, similarly 
attacked Smith’s love of ‘conjectural criticism’.83 William Binney, Professor at the 
Aberdeen Free Church College, classed people like Smith who doubted the Mosaic 
authorship of Deuteronomy as ‘infidels’.84 And in a lengthy rebuttal, the Irish 
Presbyterian theologian Robert Watts sniped: ‘One cannot choose between such a theory 
and scepticism for the simple reason that there is no difference between the two things 
… Whether it come from the pen of a Kuenen, or a Wellhausen, or a Smith, it is still the 
same faith-subverting theory’.85 
Dismissal from his Aberdeen Chair did nothing to curb Smith’s fertile mind and from 
his new position at the University of Cambridge he issued ever more influential insights. 
His 1887 Burnett Lectures, later published as The Religion of the Semites, and described as 
‘one of the founding texts of modern anthropology’, are illustrative.86 The entire edifice 
was erected on an evolutionary scaffolding. To Smith, traditional practices had evolved 
slowly over the course of centuries, and for that reason bore the stamp of ‘habits of 
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thought characteristic of very diverse stages of man’s intellectual and moral 
development’. Perhaps reflecting the lessons on physical geography that he had received 
from his father,87 Smith was sure that ritual forms disclosed historical sequencing 
analogous to geological strata:  
 
The record of the religious thought of mankind, as it is embodied in religious 
institutions, resembles the geological record of the history of the earth’s crust; the new 
and the old are preserved side by side, or rather layer upon layer. The classification of 
ritual formations in their proper sequence is the first step towards their explanation, 
and that explanation itself must take the form, not of a speculative theory, but of a 
rational life-history.88  
 
This evolutionary methodology perfectly suited Smith’s project, for he was certain that to 
elucidate the true nature of primitive religion, practice must take precedence over dogma, 
and the customary segregation of religious observance from ordinary life must be broken 
down. Because ‘antique religions had for the most part no creed’, their study ‘must begin, 
not with myth, but with ritual and traditional usage’.89 The fundamental character of 
institutions and practices meant that, for Smith, the basic unit of analysis was community 
practice, not individual belief. Individuals did not decide on their religion in primeval 
times; rather religion came to them as a fundamental constituent of the social obligations 
laid upon them by virtue of their location in family and clan.  
Having thus laid down the foundations on which his analysis would be constructed, 
Smith turned his thoughts to the evolution of ritual in the Hebrew cult. Drawing again 
on the inspiration of McLennan, he underscored the central role of sacrifice in the 
production and reproduction of a primal sense of social belonging. The ritual slaying and 
devouring of a totemic victim, normally regarded as taboo, were taken by Smith as an 
exercise in sacramental communion between the human and divine worlds and as the 
means of maintaining a primal sense of clan cohesion and tribal harmony.90 Sacrificial 
observance was thus central to ancient tribal life. ‘[P]articipation in the flesh of a 
sacrosanct victim, and the solemn mystery of its death’, Smith explained, was the only 
way in which ‘the sacred cement [could] be procured which creates or keeps alive a living 
bond of union between the worshippers and their god’.91 
But there was even more to Smith’s theory than this. Primordial sacramental feasting, 
he was convinced, was not confined to animal sacrifice. Cases of human ceremonial 
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slaying and ritualistic cannibalism were to be found, and Smith was sure that their 
progressive demise was not on account of any natural human revulsion against 
consuming human flesh. ‘What seems to us to be natural loathing’ he observed, ‘often 
turns out … to be based on a religious taboo, and to have its origin not in feelings of 
contemptuous disgust but of reverential dread’.92 Of course as these ritual systems 
evolved, their exterior features were progressively stripped of such repulsive 
undertakings. The ‘primitive crudity of the ceremonial was modified and the meaning of 
the act is therefore more or less disguised,’ Smith explained. Its genesis was obscured, 
but its deep structure endured. It crystallised in later Hebrew ceremonial regulations 
about ritual uncleanness, forbidden foods and the like, revealing that certain rites 
‘preserved with great accuracy the features of a sacrificial ritual of extreme antiquity’.93  
All of this fell foul of the axiomatic assumptions of traditional Scottish Calvinists, not 
least when Smith’s observations gestured towards eucharist. This was especially so when 
he spoke of how ‘the various aspects in which atoning rites presented themselves to 
ancient worshippers have supplied a variety of religious images which passed into 
Christianity, and still have currency’. Critical theological terms such as ‘redemption, 
substitution, purification, atoning blood, the garment of righteousness’ could thus all be 
traced back ‘to antique ritual’.94 Plainly the entire architecture of the Judaeo-Christian 
system of salvation, though stripped of its primeval debauchery, was associated in some 
deep way with mimetic cannibalism. 
The application of the methods of natural science to the biblical record and the 
religious life of the ancient Semites had brought Smith a long way. Indeed the degree to 
which he embraced these modes of analysis, according to the biblical scholar John 
Rogerson, ‘has sometimes been misunderstood to the point of thinking that Smith 
modified or gave up his own Christian beliefs’.95 For radical though his conclusions 
might seem, there is every reason to suppose that Smith’s methodology was forged in the 
crucible of his theological credo. As Rogerson continues: ‘it cannot be stressed strongly 
enough that Smith was not a compromiser, or someone who accepted the results of 
criticism reluctantly, and accommodated them to an increasingly watered-down version 
of Christianity. On the contrary, Smith was an enthusiast for biblical criticism because he 
believed that it freed the Old Testament from fetters that made it a closed book’.96 Even 
if this assessment is perhaps overly sanguine about the degree to which Smith’s theology 
remained constant, there is no doubt that in adopting naturalistic criticism Smith was 
engaged in a project to vindicate rather than invalidate divine revelation. As Riesen 
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insists, Smith sought ‘to advance faith not in spite of but by means of the critical 
method’.97   
Perhaps Smith’s clearest explanation of his methodological machinery came in the 
series of lectures on The Old Testament in the Jewish Church he delivered in the winter of 
1880 to an estimated average audience of eighteen hundred in Edinburgh and Glasgow. 
What animated this entire enterprise was his confidence that an evolutionary perspective 
could shore up what he believed to be the essence of Judaeo-Christian truth and so 
Smith began by insisting that the ‘great value of historical criticism is that it makes the 
Old Testament more real to us’. To be sure, there was ‘a widespread uneasy suspicion 
that this history cannot bear to be tested like other ancient histories’. But that was a 
misplaced fear, for the simple reason that the ‘old method of explaining difficulties and 
reconciling apparent contradictions would no longer be tolerated in dealing with other 
books’.98 The whole point of his endeavours, by contrast, was to convince hearers that 
biblical criticism, ‘a branch of historical science’, using naturalistic methods, was both 
‘legitimate and necessary’. For to Smith, it was only by applying its empirical procedures 
that readers could come to ‘distinguish between the accidental and the essential, the 
human conjectures and the divine truth’. The task was to mobilise the historical sciences 
to piece together the true chronology of the Hebrew canon and to ‘separate’ out the 
different ‘instrumentalities’ and ‘elements’ that had come together in its construction. To 
achieve this end he emphasised that the prophetic writers ‘were not mere impassive 
channels through whose lips or pens God poured forth abstract doctrine’ and were 
certainly ‘not exempt from the necessary laws and limitations of human speech’.99 
A couple of years later Smith put these principles to work in his analysis of The 
Prophets of Israel. Here he underscored the fertility of evolutionary modes of explanation. 
The record of revelation, he insisted, could only be understood organically – ‘by tracing 
its growth’. ‘A mechanism’, he explained, ‘is studied by taking it to pieces, an organism 
must be studied by watching its development from the simplicity of the germ to the final 
complexity of the finished structure’.100 This meant that ‘revelation follows the laws of 
historical progress’ just as ‘a law of continuity runs through the succession of physical 
phenomena’; plainly there were ‘laws in the moral world as well as in the material 
cosmos’. And so the insights of natural scientific explanation should be embraced not 
feared, proclaimed not concealed: ‘In the interests of religion, as well as of sound 
knowledge, it is of the highest importance that everything which scholarship has to tell 
about the Old and New Testaments should be plainly and fully set before the intelligent 
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Bible readers. The timidity which shrinks from this frankness, lest the untrained student 
may make a wrong use of the knowledge put in his hands, is wholly out of place in 
Protestant Churches’.101  
Seen in this light the anonymous ‘Scotulus’ –  a Free Review critic – failed to perceive 
the theological mainsprings of Smith’s textual and anthropological endeavours when he 
complained, at the time of Smith’s death, that ‘he pursued the methods of rationalistic 
literary analysis while holding to the faith of Bibliolatrous superstition’.102 It is something 
similar with the religious studies scholar Robert Segal who, while appreciating his 
pioneering contributions, questions Smith’s status as ‘the first modern sociologist of 
religion’ since he restricted sociological analysis to ancient religion, allegedly because he 
wanted to preserve his own theological commitments. As he concludes, Smith’s 
‘theological approach to higher religion sought to keep the door closed to a wholly 
secular account of modern religion’.103 What these diagnoses underplay is the extent to 
which Smith’s anthropological and sociological innovations were propelled by theological 
convictions. 
For of course William Robertson Smith never set out to be a modern ‘sociologist’ or 
‘anthropologist’. He was a theologian from beginning to end – but a theologian 
embarked on the task of showing how scientific explanations could sustain genuine faith 
rather than subvert it, and enable authentic spirituality to be detached from mere cultic 
ceremonial. Smith’s inquiries into the genealogy of Semitic religion were neither ‘a 
neutral investigation nor an exercise in comparative religion for the sake of undermining 
religious truth claims’.104 Rather they were designed to excavate what he called ‘the first 
germs of eternal truths’ that lay buried beneath the materialist surface of external ritual 
forms.105 For Smith’s passion was to use the methods of scientific criticism to ‘show to 
the world the Divine Revelation of God in the Old Testament’.106 
 
Conclusion 
Both Alexander Winchell and William Robertson Smith display something of the ways in 
which naturalistic explanations prominent in the new sciences of physical and cultural 
anthropology could be marshalled in the service of religion in general, and in divine 
revelation in particular. This does not imply of course that their modes of operation were 
identical.  They were located in different places where different concerns troubled their 
local constituencies. Amongst Winchell’s Methodists in the American South matters of 
race relations and the mobilisation of anthropology to query traditional monogenism 
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loomed large. In Scotland, Smith’s redrafting of the understanding of scripture to 
accommodate German higher criticism and to recast it as a record of revelation was 
widely thought to conflict with the Westminster Confession of Faith. The revelations 
that they found in anthropology, too, were of different kinds. Insofar as the ‘Baconian 
Compromise’, as Moore terms it, remained relevant in late nineteenth century 
anthropological endeavour, Winchell might be seen as promoting its insistence that 
scriptural revelation had to be read in the light of God’s revelation in nature.107  Smith, by 
contrast, seems to have abandoned that path by conceiving of scripture more as a 
chronicle of evolving spiritual consciousness than merely propositional revelation. Yet 
they were united in their conviction that scientific insights could liberate the kernel of 
real faith from the husk of traditionalist hermeneutics and thereby demonstrate that 
naturalistic anthropological explanations could be of real theological benefit. 
Winchell’s refusal of the conventional distinction between natural and supernatural 
agency complicates the received understanding of the essence of naturalistic science, 
while his adoption of archaeo-anthropological findings to preserve the integrity of the 
Mosaic chronicle hints at a counter-narrative to the standard reading of naturalistic 
anthropology as inherently hostile to biblical chronology. As for Smith, his endeavours 
remind us that the emergence of the anthropology of religion as a scientific pursuit was 
itself facilitated in no small measure by the advent of historical-critical studies of the 
Bible which submitted the Hebrew scriptures to the same kind of ‘naturalistic scrutiny as 
any piece of literature’.108 Despite their best efforts, of course, both men suffered the fate 
of heretics by being dismissed from their positions at church-governed institutions. In 
both cases they had found in the revelations of anthropology resources that they believed 
would vindicate the revelations attested to in scripture. In large measure their espousal of 
the findings of natural science was motivated by theological concerns to retain faith not 
to overturn it, to support the scriptural record not to destabilise it. Their different 
constituencies did not agree. To the guardians of orthodoxy, they were allies of 
rationalism and purveyors of heresy. But if that was the settled judgment of their 
denominational paymasters, then to Winchell and Smith heresy was orthodoxy’s most 
urgent imperative.  
 
* School of Geography, Archaeology and Palaeoecology, Queen’s University Belfast, Belfast, 




I am most grateful to Diarmid Finnegan and Peter Harrison for their insightful comments on an earlier 
draft of this paper, to Joe Webster for enlightening conversations about anthropology and religion, to Tim 
Larsen for a number of valuable leads, and to two anonymous readers whose observations have helped me 
further clarify my arguments. 
 
 
                                                
1 ‘“Heresy” at Vanderbilt’, Nashville Daily American 16 June, 1878; Alexander Winchell, 
‘Science gagged in Nashville’, Nashville Daily American 16 June, 1878. 
2 Mary Engel, ‘A chapter in the history of academic freedom: the case of Alexander 
Winchell’, History of Education Journal (1959) 10, pp. 73-80. 
3 ‘The Aberdeen heresy case’, Aberdeen Weekly Journal 28 May, 1878. 
4 John Sutherland Black and George Chrystal, The Life of William Robertson Smith London: 
Adam & Charles Black, 1912, p. 426. 
5 Andrew Dickson White, A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom Vol. 
1, New York: Appleton, 1896, p. 168. 
6 Matthew Stanley examines the adoption of naturalist methods in Victorian science by 
theistic scientists in ‘The uniformity of natural laws in Victorian Britain: naturalism, 
theism, and scientific practice’, Zygon, (2011) 46, pp. 536-560 
7 H. Ricardo Brown, Until Darwin, Science, Human Variety and the Origins of Race, London: 
Pickering & Chatto, 2010, pp. 59, 60.  
8 Thomas F. Gossett, Race: The History of an Idea in America, New York: Schocken Books, 
1965, p. 64. 
9 Josiah C. Nott, Two Lectures on the Connection between the Biblical and Physical History of Man, 
Delivered by Invitation, from the Chair of Political Economy, Etc, of the Louisiana University, in 
December, 1848, New York: Bartlett and Welford, 1849, p. 7. 
10 William Stanton, The Leopard’s Spots: Scientific Attitudes Toward Race in America 1815-1859 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960, p. 119. 
11 Stanton, op. cit. (10), p. 122. 
12 Stanton, op. cit. (10), pp. 122, 196. 
13 Abraham Coles, A Critique on Nott and Gliddon’s Ethnological Works, Burlington, N.J.: 
Office of the Medical and Surgical Reporter, 1857, p. 9. 
14 Stanton, op. cit. (10), p. 193. 
15 Coles, Critique on Nott and Gliddon’s Ethnological Works, p. 6. 
16 Stewart E. Guthrie, ‘Anthropological theories of religion’, in Michael Martin (ed.), The 
Cambridge Companion to Atheism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. 283-
290, on p. 283. 
17 Jennifer Michael Hecht, The End of the Soul: Scientific Modernity, Atheism, and Anthropology 
in France, New york: Columbia University Press, 2003, pp. 56, 76, 65.  
18 Robert Carneiro, Evolutionism in Cultural Anthropology, Boulder Colo.: Westview Press, 
2003, p. 287. 
19 Roger Smith, The Fontana History of the Human Sciences, London: Fontana Press, 1997, p. 
479.  
20 Henrika Kuklick, The Savage Within: The Social History of British Anthropology, 1885-1945, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 79.  
21 See Timothy Larsen, ‘E.B. Tylor, religion and anthropology’, British Journal for the History 
of Science, (2013) 46, pp. 467-485.  Recently Keel has argued that despite his rejection of 
Christianity Tylor actually perpetuated, unbeknownst to himself, elements derived from a 
 23 
                                                                                                                                      
Christian theology of the natural world. See Terence D. Keel, ‘Religion, polygenism and 
the early science of human origins’, History of the Human Sciences (2013) 26, pp. 3-32.  
22 John W. Burrow Evolution and Society: A Study in Victorian Social Theory, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1966, p. 256. The extract from Tylor comes from E. B. 
Tylor, Primitive Culture: Researches Into the Development of Mythology, Philosophy, Religion, Art, 
and Custom, London: John Murray, 1871, vol 1, p. 21.   
23 George W. Stocking Jr., Victorian Anthropology, New York: The Free Press, 1987, p. 195. 
See also Reginald Horsman, Josiah Nott of Mobile: Southerner, Physician, and Racial Theorist, 
Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1987). 
24 Ivan Strenski, ‘The spiritual dimension’, in Henrika Kuklick (ed), A New History of 
Anthropology, Oxford: Blackwell, 2008, pp. 113-127, on p. 119. 
25 Edmund Leach, ‘The anthropology of religion: British and French schools’, in Ninian 
Smart, John Clayton, Steven Katz and Patrick Sherry (eds), Nineteenth Century Religious 
Thought in the West, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, vol. 3, pp. 215-262, on 
p. 217. 
26 E.E. Evans-Pritchard, ‘Religion and the anthropologists’, in Essays in Social Anthropology, 
London: Faber and Faber, 1962, pp. 29-45, on p. 36. 
27 Strenski, op. cit. (24), p.113. 
28 The role of place in shaping scientific enterprises in David N. Livingstone, Putting 
Science in its Place, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003. 
29 Alexander Winchell, Reconciliation of Science and Religion, New York: Harper, 1877, pp. 31, 
28, 31. 
30 Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concept of Pollution and Taboo, London: 
Routledge, 2002, orig. 1966, p. 19. 
31 See the forthcoming collection of essays edited by Peter Harrison. I am grateful to 
Professor Harrison for sharing with me a draft of his introduction.  See also Gowan 
Dawson and Bernard Lightman (eds), Victorian Scientific Naturalism: Community, Identity, 
Continuity, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014.  
32 F. Garvin Davenport, ‘Alexander Winchell: Michigan scientist and educator’, Michigan 
History (1951) 35, pp. 185-201. 
33 Leonard Alberstadt, ‘Alexander Winchell’s preadamites – a case for dismissal from 
Vanderbilt University’, Earth Sciences History (1994) 13, pp. 997-112; Mary Engel, ‘A 
chapter in the history of academic freedom: the case of Alexander Winchell’, History of 
Education Journal (1959) 10, pp. 73-80; Maura Jane Farrelly, ‘‘God is the author of both’: 
science, religion, and the intellectualization of American Methodism’, Church History 
(2008) 77, pp. 659-687; Mark David Wood, ‘Debating science and religion: towards a 
comparative geography of public controversy, 1874-1895’, PhD thesis, Queen’s 
University Belfast, 2011. 
34 White, op. cit. (5), vol. 1, 84. 
35 Alexander Winchell, op. cit. (29),New York: Harper, 1877, p. v. On Cope’s Neo-
Lamarckism, see Peter J. Bowler, The Eclipse of Darwinism: Anti-Darwinian Theory of 
Evolution in the Decades Around 1900, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983. 
36 Recorded in his 1878 diary, cited in Wood, op. cit. (33), pp. 121, 124. 
37 Winchell, op. cit. (1). 
38 Oscar Penn Fitzgerald, Dr Summers: A Life-Study, Nashville: Southern Methodist 
Publishing House, 1885, pp. 288, 289. 
39 Alexander Winchell, Adamites and Preadamites: A Popular Discussion Concerning the Remote 
Representatives of the Human Species and their Relation to the Biblical Adam, Syracuse: John T. 
Roberts, 1878. 
 24 
                                                                                                                                      
40 Alexander Winchell, Preadamites; or a Demonstration of the Existence of Men before Adam 
together with a Study of their Condition, Antiquity, Racial Affinities, and Progressive Dispersion over 
the Earth, Chicago: S.C. Griggs, 1880. 
41 See David N. Livingstone, Adam’s Ancestors: Race, Religion and the Politics of Human 
Origins, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008. 
42 See Reginald F. Hildebrand, The Times were Strange and Stirring: Methodist Preachers and the 
Crisis of Emancipation, Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1995. The Methodist 
commitment to human unity, however, did not ‘alter the basic pattern of “an inferior and 
subordinate relation” of blacks in the church’. William B. Gravely, ‘The social, political 
and religious significance of the formation of the colored Methodist Episcopal Church 
(1870)’, Methodist History (1979) 18, pp. 3-25, on p. 8. 
43 T.O. Summers, ‘Vanderbilt University and the critics’, Nashville Christian Advocate 13 
July 1878. 
44 Cited in Alberstadt, op. cit. (33), p. 110. 
45 Winchell, op. cit. (40), p. v. 
46 See the discussion in Livingstone, op. cit. (41), chapter 6. 
47 Quoted in Wood, op. cit. (33), p. 144. 
48 Richard Popkin, Isaac La Peyrère (1596-1676). His Life, Work and Influence, Leiden: Brill, 
1987, p. 1. 
49 Richard Popkin, ‘Pre-adamism in 19th century American thought: ‘Speculative biology’ 
and racism’, Philosophia (1978) 8, pp. 205-239, on p. 206. 
50 Winchell, op. cit. (39), p. 6; Winchell, op. cit. (40), p. 457. 
51 Quoted in White, History of the Warfare, Vol. 1, p. 315. See also Farrelly, op. cit. (33). 
52 Summers, ‘Vanderbilt University’. See also Charles A. Israel, Before Scopes: Evangelicalism, 
Education, and Evolution in Tennessee, 1870-1925, Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 
2004, p. 135. 
53 ‘The Vanderbilt and Dr. Winchell’, Wesleyan Christian Advocate 17 August, 1878, quoted 
in Wood, op. cit. (33), p. 146. 
54 Winchell, op. cit. (29), p. 144.  
55 Winchell, op. cit. (29), p. 132. The passage, with minor differences, comes from John 
William Draper, A History of the Intellectual Development of Europe, New York: Harper 
Brothers, 1864, p. 74. 
56 Winchell, op. cit. (29), p. 204. 
57 Winchell, op. cit. (39), pp. 4, 7. 
58 Winchell, op. cit. (39), p. 19, 20 
59 Winchell, op. cit. (39), pp. 47, 48, 49. 
60 Winchell, op. cit. (39), pp. 26-27. 
61 Winchell, op. cit. (39), p. 29. 
62 Anthony Grafton, New Worlds, Ancient Texts: The Power of Tradition and the Shock of 
Discovery, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1992, p. 211. 
63 Bernhard Maier, William Robertson Smith: His Life, His Work, His Times, Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 2009; Gillian M. Bediako, Primal Religion and the Bible: William Robertson Smith and 
his Heritage, Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1997; T.O. Beidelman, W. Robertson 
Smith and the Sociological Study of Religion, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974. A 
summary account of Smith’s anthropological contributions is provided by George W. 
Stocking Jr., After Tylor: British Social Anthropology, 1888-1951, Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1995, pp. 63-81. 
64 Sigmund Freud, Totem and Taboo: Resemblances between the Psychic Lives of Savages and 
Neurotics, London: Routledge, 1919, pp. 220, 221; Sigmund Freud, An Autobiographical 
Study, New York: Norton, 1952, p. 76. 
 25 
                                                                                                                                      
65 Émile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life: A Study in Religious Sociology, 
London: Allen and Unwin, 1915, p. 336. 
66 Douglas, op. cit. (30), p. 19.  
67 The circumstances of the trial are discussed in Black and Chrystal, op. cit. (4); William 
Johnstone (ed), William Robertson Smith: Essays in Reassessment, Sheffield: Sheffield 
Academic Press, 1995. 
68 William Robertson Smith, ‘Bible’, Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1875, ninth edition, volume 3, 
p. 634. 
69 William Robertson Smith, ‘Prophecy and personality: a fragment’, (1868) in John 
Sutherland Black and George Chrystal (eds), Lectures and Essays of William Robertson Smith, 
London: Adam and Charles Black, 1912, pp. 97-108, on pp. 98, 97.  
70 Quoted in John Sutherland Black and George Chrystal, op. cit. (4), p. 209. 
71 Quoted in Black and Chrystal, op. cit. (4), p. 360. 
72 J.F. McLennan, ‘The Worship of Animals and Plants’, Fortnightly Review NS (1869) 4, 
pp. 407–427, 562-582; (1870), 7, pp. 194-216. 
73 See Adam Kuper, The Invention of Primitive Society: Transformations of an Illusion, London: 
Routledge, 1991, pp. 82-83; Robert Alun Jones, The Secret of the Totem: Religion and Society 
from McLennan to Freud, New York: Columbia Press, 2005.  
74 John F. McLennan, Primitive Marriage: An Inquiry into the Origins of the Form of Capture in 
Marriage Ceremonies, Edinburgh: A&C Black, 1865. 
75 See Margaret Hodgen, ‘The Doctrine of Survivals: The History of an Idea’, American 
Anthropologist, (1931) 33, pp. 307-324; and Stocking, Victorian Anthropology. 
76 Levirate marriage refers to a Jewish law requiring a deceased man’s brother, who died 
childless, to marry the widow. 
77 William Robertson Smith, ‘Animal Worship and Animal Tribes among the Arabs and 
in the Old Testament’, Journal of Philology (1880) 9, pp.75-100, on p. 78, 99, 100.  
78 Scotsman 29 July 1880, p. 4. 
79 Cited in Black and Chrystal, op. cit. (4), pp. 381-382. 
80 Black and Chrystal, op. cit. (4), p. 438.  
81 ‘The case of Professor Robertson Smith’, Scotsman 15 March 1878. 
82 ‘Rev. Dr. Kennedy, Dingwall, on Robertson Smith’s Case’, Scotsman 10 June 1880. 
83 Cited in Black and Chrystal, op. cit. (4), p. 418. 
84 ‘Letters to the Editor. Professor Robertson Smith and the Rev. Dr Binnie’, Scotsman 21 
1880. 
85 Robert Watts, The Newer Criticism and the Analogy of the Faith: A Reply to Lectures by W. 
Robertson Smith, M.A., on the Old Testament in the Jewish Church, Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
1882, pp. ix, x. 
86 Christopher Herbert, Culture and Anomie: Ethnographic Imagination in the Nineteenth Century, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, p. 56.  
87 See Bediako, op. cit. (63), p. 123. 
88 William Robertson Smith, Lectures on the Religion of the Semites, London: Black, 1889, p. 
26. 
89 Smith, op. cit. (88), pp. 18, 20.  
90 Accounts of Smith’s anthropology of sacrifice abound. See, for example, Margit 
Warburg, ‘William Robertson Smith and the study of religion’, Religion (1989) 19, pp. 41-
61; Gordon Booth, ‘The fruits of sacrifice: Sigmund Freud and William Robertson 
Smith’, Expository Times (2002) 113, pp. 258-264; George Elder Davie, ‘Scottish 
philosophy and Robertson Smith’, in The Scottish Enlightenment and Other Essays, 
Edinburgh: Polygon, 1991, pp. 101-145.  
91 Smith, op. cit. (88), p. 295.  
 26 
                                                                                                                                      
92 William Robertson Smith, Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia, London: Black, 1885, 
pp. 306-307. 
93 Smith, op. cit. (88), p. 277.  
94 Smith, op. cit. (88), p. 418.  
95 John W. Rogerson, The Bible and Criticism in Victorian Britain: Profiles of F.D. Maurice and 
William Robertson Smith, Sheffield: Sheffield University Press, 1995, p. 71. 
96 John W. Rogerson, ‘W.R. Smith’s The Old Testament in the Jewish Church: its antecedents, 
its influence and its abiding value’, in Johnstone (ed), William Robertson Smith, pp. 132-
147, on p. 142. 
97 Richard Allen Riesen, Criticism and Faith in Late Victorian Scotland: A.B. Davidson, William 
Robertson Smith and George Adam Smith, Lantham: University Press of America, 1985, p. 
117. In a more recent account which lays greater emphasis on the significance of 
ecclesiological problems than on critical questions, Kidd and Wallace stress that 
Robertson Smith and his defenders ‘emphasized that biblical criticism, far from being 
crypto-Moderatism, was a continuation of Reformation principles and true Calvinism’. 
See Colin Kidd and Valerie Wallace, ‘Biblical criticism and Scots Presbyterian dissent in 
the age of Robertson Smith’, in Scott Mandelbrote and Michael Ledger-Lomas (eds), 
Dissent and the Bible in Britain, c. 1650-1950, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 
233-255, on p. 245. 
98 William Robertson Smith, The Old Testament in the Jewish Church, London: Black, 1895, 
second enlarged edition, p. xi. 
99 Smith, op. cit. (98), pp. 1, 13, 13, 15. 
100 William Robertson Smith, The Prophets of Israel and their Place in History to the Close of the 
Eighth Century B.C., London: Black, new edition 1895 [orig. 1882], pp. 6-7. 
101 Smith, The Prophets of Israel, pp. 3, lii. 
102 Scotulus, ‘Professor Robertson Smith: a problem’, The Free Review (1894) May 1, 97-
107, on p. 98. 
103 Robert Segal, ‘William Robertson Smith: sociologist or theologian?’, Religion 38 (2008): 
9-24, on pp. 9, 24.  
104 Gillian M. Bediako, ‘“To capture the modern universe of thought”: Religion of the 
Semites as an attempt at a Christian comparative religion’, in Johnstone, William Robertson 
Smith, pp. 118-130, on p. 126. 
105 William Robertson Smith, ‘Sacrifice’, Encyclopaedia 1886, ninth edition, vol. 21, p. 138. 
106 Quoted in Rogerson, op. cit. (95), p. 146. 
107 James R. Moore, ‘Geologists and interpreters of Genesis in the nineteenth century’, in 
David C. Lindberg and Ronald L. Numbers (eds), God and Nature: Historical Essays on the 
Encounter Christianity and Science, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986, pp. 322-
350. 
108 Strenski, op. cit. (24), p. 115. 
